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lative history or the structure of IGRA helps determine 
which phrase to honor, and which to discard. 
In some respects, lawyers are always complaining 
about statutes' "making no sense," of course. For ex-
ample, even if we know what Congress was getting at 
in drafting an operative provision, perhaps Congress 
didn't think about the specific situation we have to deal 
with, and the well-intentioned statute leads to a result 
we "know" Congress wouldn't have wanted. Or maybe 
Congress mucked up the statutory language, putting 
in a "not" where it obviously didn't belong, or cross-
referencing "subsection (a)(3)" when it must have 
meant "(a)(2)." Or maybe different provisions, enacted 
at different times and with different congressional 
goals, coexist in tension- something that happens all 
the time with a complex statutory scheme that has 
evolved over decades. 
I 
What should judicial interpreters do 
when two simultaneously enacted 
phrases are irreconcilable? 
Cases like those aren't easy to handle, and inter-
preters won't agree on which interpretive principles 
should control or how any particular principle ought 
to apply. But at least we know how to talk about the 
issues; we know the language to use. The discussion 
will focus on matters such as plain meaning, the pur-
pose behind the particular provision or provisions, the 
larger structure in which the provisions reside, and so 
on, and the goal will be to find a coherent meaning for 
the relevant statutes. 
Some of that happened in Chickasaw Nation~ five 
of the seven justices in the majority struggled to discern 
congressional intent from the legislative history5 - but 
the difficulty was more fundamental. Saying that the 
statute in Chickasaw Nation "makes no sense" isn't hy-
perbolic. With back-to-back phrases pointing in op-
posite directions, and with Congress's having left few 
signals as to which path it intended to follow, the 
statutory provision had' no plain meaning and no clear 
purpose, and it was part of no otherwise coherent 
statutory structure that pointed in one interpretive 
direction. The statute was, quite simply, broken. 
Although the situation in Chickasaw Nation was un-
usual, one hopes- with a single statutory provision, 
enacted at a single time, so clearly botched - it il-
lustrates what must be an increasing problem. There's 
not much chance that the U.S. Code and state codes 
will shrink in size and complexity, and the greater the 
statutory volume, the more likely it is that blatant con-
tradictions will occur. 
What should judicial interpreters do when two 
simultaneously enacted phrases are irreconcilable? 
One possibility is the judicial ~quivalent of flipping a 
5Chickasaw Nation, 122 S. Ct. at 533-35. Justices Scalia and 
Thomas didn't join the part of the opinion discussing legisla-
tive history, and the two dissenters, Justices O'Connor and 
Souter, disagreed with the Court's reading of that history. 
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coin, with a court's saying (or at least meaning) some-
thing like the following: "We don't know what the right 
answer is (and the legislature obviously didn't know 
either), but we have to decide, so we'll make a choice 
as best we can. We're not talking constitutional law 
here, and, if we've misunde~rstood what the legislature 
meant, or would have meant if it had been paying 
attention, the legislature can clean up the problem for 
the future. In fact, even if we get it 'right,' in some 
sense, the legislature should still clean up the statutory 
language to avoid confusing others." 
Coin-flipping may lack intellectual elegance, but it's 
a perfectly respectable judicial procedure in limited 
circumstances: when a court must deal with a hope-
lessly broken statute and it has nothing else to grab 
ahold of. In ruling against the tribes in Chickasaw Na-
tion, the Court (obviously) didn't say it was doing any 
such thing; it referred to a tax canon, congressional 
intent, and other plausible justifications for concluding 
that the tribes were liable for the taxes. 6 But, to my 
mind, this was a coin flip, and it wasn't an appropriate 
case for a coin flip. 
I'll argue that the Court had a cleaner way to resolve 
the dispute in Chickasaw Nation, and to do so in a way 
consistent with existing authority. Because of the 
American Indian law character of the case, there was 
a tie-breaking principle, derived from the so-called In-
dian canons of construction, that should have led to a 
fairly clear result. And that result was the one 
promoted by dissenting Justices Sandra Day O'Connor 
and David H. Souter: Without a congressional state-
ment to the contrary, the tribes should have been ex-
empt from the excise and occupational taxes at issue 
in the cases. 
In Part I, I describe the IGRA language that gave rise 
to the interpretive problem in Chickasaw Nation. In Part 
II, I introduce the Indian canons of construction, which 
I'll later argue (in Part IV) should have been used to 
resolve the dispute. In Part III, I provide an executive 
summary of the major points made by the majority and 
the dissenters in Chickasaw Nation. Finally, in Part IV, I 
question whether it was appropriate for the Court to 
have discounted the significance of the Indian canons 
in its decision, particularly in a case where, I'll argue, 
there should have been no presumption that the tribes 
would be subject to the wagering taxes. 
I. The Broken Statutory Provision 
Most of the high-profile legal issues that have arisen 
under IGRA- having to do with the uneasy relation-
ship between states and tribes in regulating gambling 
in Indian country - aren't relevant for present pur-
poses. What is relevant is one previously obscure pas-
sage in IGRA, codified at section 2719(d)(l) of Title 25: 
The provisions of [the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986] (including sections 1441, 3402(q), 6041, and 
6050I, and chapter 35 of such Code) concerning 
the reporting and withholding of taxes with 
respect to the winnings from gaming or wagering 
6See infra Part III.A. 
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operations shall apply to Indian gaming opera-
tions conducted pursuant to this chapter, or 
under a Tribal-State compact entered into under 
section 2710(d)(3) of this title that is in effect, in 
the same manner as such provisions apply to 
State gaming and wagering operations. 7 
This language is definitely of the eyes-glazing-over 
type. It's legalese at its worst, complete with a "con-
cerning," a "with respect to," a "pursuant to," and the 
rest of it- all in one sentence.8 To figure out who has 
to do what, we have to read all those mind-numbing 
provisions in the Internal Revenue Code (sections 1441, 
3402( q), etc.), and that's unpleasant. But it's the sort of 
thing that readers of Tax Notes are trained to do, and it 
can be done. Moreover, taken as a whole, the IGRA . 
passage seems relatively straightforward: Tribes are to 
be treated the same as states for certain purposes. 
This language is definitely of the 
eyes-glazing-over type. It's legalese at 
its worst, complete with a 
'concerning,' a 'with respect to,' a 
'pursuant to,' and the rest of it - all in 
one sentence. 
Sections 1441, 3402(q), 6041, and 6050! all deal with 
reporting or withholding.9 If states have to report and 
withhold when someone hits a state gambling jackpot 
(which, in the state context, generally means a lottery 
winner), then tribes should have to do so, too. 10 If states 
don't have to report and withhold, then tribes 
shouldn't have to either. Without getting into nitty-
gritty details,, we can easily understand the general 
principle: States and tribes must report and withhold 
725 U.S.C. section 2719(d)(1). It's ironic, given the drafting 
glitch at issue in Chickasaw Nation, that the majority's opinion, 
as set out in the slip version and reprinted by the proprietary 
services, cited to a nonexistent section 2719( d)(i) of IGRA, 
rather than to 2719(d)(1). (The dissenting justices simply cited 
to 2719(d).) I can find no explanation for this except inadver-
tence. In the Court's defense, I should note that the citation 
mistake shouldn't cause any substantive confusion (although 
it wasted a few minutes of my time). 
8Those of you old enough to remember the practice should 
try diagramming the sentence. 
9Section 1441 provides, in general, for withholding of tax 
on certain payments to nonresident aliens. Section 3402( q) 
provides for withholding on certain gambling winnings. Sec-
tion 6041 imposes reporting obligations on payors for certain 
payments exceeding $600. And section 60501 imposes certain 
reporting obligations in connection with ca?h received in 
amounts greater than $10,000. Section references are to the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, except as other-
wise noted. 
10Imposing these requirements on states and tribes may 
be an imposition on sovereign or quasi-sovereign bodies, but 
the purpose of reporting and withholding is perfectly ap-
propriate: to prevent gambling winners, people like you or 
me (more likely you), from escaping income tax liability. 
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for bigger awards in high-risk games, and in some 
other circumstances as well. 11 
So far, so good. The problem with the IGRA provi-
sion, however- the reason it doesn't work- is the 
reference to "chapter 35 of such Code," included in the 
same parenthetical as the cross-referenced reporting 
and withholding sections. Chapter 35 has nothing to 
do with reporting and withholding. It imposes taxes 
on those who conduct certain gambling operations -
the chapter is titled "taxes on wagering"- with some 
specific exemptions, including one for state-conducted 
lotteries. 
l)nder chapter 35, section 4401 imposes "on any 
wager authorized under the law of the State in which 
accepted an excise tax equal to 0.25 percent of the 
amount of such wager."12 Section 4402 then generally 
exempts "state-conducted lotteries" from the excise.13 
Section 4411 imposes a "special tax of $500 per year to 
be paid by each person who is liable for the tax im-
posed under section 4401," 14 but, because of section 
4402, the occupational tax wouldn't apply to a state 
that conducts a "state-conducted lottery." Nothing is 
said in chapter 35 about the liability of American In-
dian tribes one way or the other. 
The two key phrases in IGRA section 2719(d)(1) are 
thus "chapter 35 of such Code" and "concerning the 
reporting and withholding of taxes," and the statute is 
written as if the former were an example of the latter. 
But it's not. Either the reference to chapter 35 doesn't 
belong in the. parenthetical, or, if it does belong, the 
phrase "reporting and withholding obligations" is an 
incomplete description of what the provision applies 
to. As it is, section 2719(d)(1) is garbled. 
All of which leads to the particular question in Chick-
asaw Nation. Since states generally don't have to pay 
"taxes on wagering" on their lotteries, did Congress 
mean, by referring to "chapter 35," that tribes should 
also be exempt from those taxes? (If the reference in 
IGRA to "chapter 35" means anything at all - which, 
to be sure, isn't clear - it presumably means that. )15 
Or did Congress intend, with the reference to "report-
ing and withholding of taxes," to exempt tribes from 
certain reporting and withholding obligations and 
nothing else? 
11Withholding is required generally for winnings over 
$5,000, if "the amount of such proceeds is at least 300 times 
as large as the amount wagered." Section 3402( q)(3 ). The 
statute excepts slot machines, keno, and bingo from the with-
holding obligations. Section 3402(q)(5). 
12Section 4401(a)(1). 
13Section 4402(3). 
14Section 4411(a). 
15Chapter 35 itself contains no mention of American In-
dian tribes. If tribes are exempt from the obligations under 
chapter 35, it has to be because of the cross-reference in IGRA. 
Section 7871 provides for treating Indian tribal governments 
as states for certain purposes, such as the charitable contri-
bution deduction and specified excise taxes, but none of the 
listed purposes even arguably applies to wagering opera-
tions. 
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Both possibilities can't be right. By its terms, the 
statute is contradictory, and the legislative history is of 
little help in explaining the meaning of the cryptic 
reference to "chapter 35." Or perhaps it's the reference 
to "reporting and withholding obligations" that's cryp-
tic; maybe Congress really meant to exempt the tribes 
from the wagering taxes but botched the rest of the 
statute. The legislative history doesn't help much with 
that question either.16 
Not surprisingly, both the tribes and the United 
States wanted to rewrite the statute to give it coherence, 
and that led to some pointed exchanges at oral argu-
ment. In a reply brief, and then at oral argument, the 
tribes argued that the nonparenthetical language 
should be reconceptualized to provide the same treat-
ment for tribes as for states: "concerning (a) the report-
ing and withholding of taxes with respect to the win-
nings from gaming or (b) wagering operations."17 Such 
a reading, if accepted, would have given the tribes a 
broad exemption from federal wagering taxes, just like 
the states for their lotteries.18 At oral argument, Justice 
Antonin Scalia responded: "This meaning didn't occur 
to you till the reply brief? That suggests how im-
plausible it is."19 In his view, "[t]he Indians' interpreta-
tion is strained."20 
Strained, yes, but the tribes weren't making up the 
reference to "chapter 35." It's in the statute, and 
statutory language generally ought to be treated as if 
it means something. The government lawyer, who ar-
gued that the reference to chapter 35 had no effect on 
tribal immunity from taxation, was asked by Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg "to concede that ... the only way 
to make sense of the statute is to treat it as if the 
reference to chapter 35 were not there."21 He made the 
concession, stating that he couldn't provide a good 
reason for "chapter 35's" being in the parenthetical. 22 
At bottom, therefore, the government's position was 
that "chapter 35" should effectively be deleted in read-
16Five members of the majority in Chickasaw Nation pur-
ported to derive help from the legislative history of IGRA, see 
infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text, but the two dis-
senters questioned the majority's reading of that history. See 
infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. 
17See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 8-10, Chickasaw Nation 
v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 528 (2001) (No. 00-507); Chickasaw 
Nation, 122 S. Ct. at 533. 
18Two other interpretational issues can arise under chapter 
35: What constitutes a "wager" for purposes of determining 
whether the excise tax potentially applies, and what con-
stitutes a "lottery" potentially eligible for the exemption for 
"state-conducted lotteries"? The government conceded in 
Chickasaw Nation that the tribes' pull-tab games were "lot-
teries" for purposes of the statute, and therefore (depending 
on the reading of the IGRA provision) potentially eligible for 
an exemption. 
19 Quoted in Carolyn Wright LaFon, "High Court Urged to 
Adopt 'Strained' Interpretation of Poorly Drafted Statute," 
Tax Notes, Oct. 8, 2001, p. 186, at 187. 
20 Quoted in id. 
21 Transcript of Oral Argument (Oct. 2, 2001), Chickasaw 
Nation v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 528 (2001) (No. 00-507). 
22Jd. 
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ing IGRA section 2719(d)(1),23 and doing that requires 
some interpretive straining, too. 
So that leaves us with the following situation: The 
statute contains two phrases that have no apparent 
way of being reconciled, aJ.!d one phrase or the other 
will have to be changed substantially, maybe even dis-
regarded, if anything approaching a coherent meaning 
is to emerge. What goes and what stays? 
II. The American Indian Canons of Construction 
One set of interpretive principles with possible 
relevance in a case like Chickasaw Nation is the so-called 
canons of construction in American Indian law. 24 In 
general, as the Supreme Court put it in 1930, in a some-
what condescending way, "doubtful expressions are to 
be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people 
who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its 
protection and good faith." 25 
I For a circuit court to have rejected the canons in a summary fashion, as the Tenth Circuit did, is almost incomprehensible. 
Although the canons were developed to interpret 
nineteenth-century treaties between the United States 
and the Indian tribes - the treaties were similar to 
contracts of adhesion, and they contained decidedly 
unusual language - the canons have been extended to 
apply to statutes, executive orders, and regulations as 
well. The canons are expressed in different terms in 
different contexts, but, whatever the language used, the 
canons encompass the following points: "(1) very 
liberal construction to determine whether Indian rights 
exist; and (2) very strict construction to determine 
whether Indian rights are to be abridged or 
23The Tenth Circuit had suggested that the reference to 
chapter 35 may have been intended to pick up the definitions 
of "wager" and "lottery" from that chapter. Chickasaw Nation, 
208 F.3d at 883. In its brief responding to the petition for 
certiorari (and supporting the grant), the government also ad-
vanced that interpretation. Brief for the United States on Peti-
tion for Certiorari at 6, Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 122 S. 
Ct. 528 (2001) (No. 00-507). In its brief on the merits, the United 
States repeated that interpretation, but seemed to downplay 
it. Brief for the United States at 14-15, Chickasaw Nation v. 
United States, 122 S. Ct. 528 (2001) (No. 00-507). With the 
concession at oral argument, the government apparently 
abandoned the attempt to attach some meaning to the refer-
ence. 
24I've discussed the canons in these pages before. See Erik 
M. Jensen, "American Indian Law Meets the Internal Reve-
nue Code: Warbus v. Commissioner," Tax Notes, Apr. 5, 1999, 
p. 105 (revised version of article originally published in 74 
North Dakota Law Review 691 (1998)) [hereinafter Jensen, War-
bus]; see also Erik M. Jensen, "American Indian Tribes and 
401(k) Plans," Tax Notes, July 3, 1995, p. 117. 
25Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930). 
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abrogated. " 26 This generally means that if there's doubt 
about the interpretation of a provision, the doubt 
should be resolved in favor of the affected tribes.27 
The application of the canons may not always be 
clear, and judges have circumvented the canons by 
purporting to find no ambiguity in inherently am-
biguous documents. Even when that happens, how-
ever, judges typically write their opinions as if the 
canons were being taken seriously28 - as well they 
should be. The canons are part of the law; they aren't 
supposed to be optional, to be applied only by tribe-
friendly courts. 
In Chickasaw Nation, however, the Tenth Circuit in 
one brief paragraph rejected using the canons of con-
struction as aids in construing IGRA: There was no 
ambiguity needing resolution, said the court, and 
therefore no role to be played by the canons.29 Perhaps 
these weren't disputes for which the canons were ap-
propriate, as the Supreme Court also ultimately 
decided. I think both courts were wrong in that deter-
mination, as I'll discuss in Part IV, but at least the 
Supreme Court grudgingly discussed the relevance of 
the canons at length.3° For a circuit court to have 
rejected the canons in a summary fashion, however, as 
the Tenth Circuit did, is almost incomprehensible.31 
III. The Supreme Court's Interpretation 
All members of the Chickasaw Nation Court agreed 
that something went wrong in drafting section 
2719(d)(l) of IGRA- on that point, no reasonable per-
son could disagree - and that something would there-
fore have to give in interpreting the statute. In this part 
26David H. Getches, et al., Federal Indian Law: Cases and 
Materials 327 (4th ed. 1998). 
27I'm willing to go further: If there is significant doubt 
about whether an ambiguity exists- if there is doubt about 
whether there is doubt - the canons should be used to re-
solve that question. It's consistent with the canons as they 
have developed to require courts to look for ways to interpret 
controlling language in favor of an affected tribe or tribal 
member. 
28 See, e.g., County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands 
of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 263 (1992) (applying 
canons generously to forbid excise tax on sale of fee land 
within reservation boundaries while generally downplaying 
effect of canons in concluding that ad valorem tax on those 
lands was permissible). 
29Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 880. 
30Given what the Court wound up saying about the 
canons, however, maybe it would have been better if the 
Court had ignored them. See infra Part IV.A. 
31It sometimes happens that a court is unaware of the 
canons and the parties make no effort to educate the court. 
(Sometimes the parties too are oblivious.) See Jensen, Warbus, 
supra note 24 (discussing Tax Court case involving American 
Indian law issues, in which Special Trial Judge wasn't ad-
vised of canons of construction). But the Tenth Circuit is the 
second busiest American Indian law circuit in the nation, 
behind only the Ninth Circuit, and Tenth Circuit judges are 
used to discussing the canons as a matter of course. 
Downplaying the canons, as the Tenth Circuit did in Chick-
asaw Nation, couldn't have been an accident. 
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of the article, I've provided an executive summary of 
the big points made by the majority and the dissenters. 
(I'll try to be balanced in my presentation, but it will 
become apparent that I think the dissenters came much 
closer to getting it right.) 
A. Majority 
The Court concluded that the statute shouldn't be 
interpreted to exempt the tribes from the excise and 
occupational taxes: "We agree with the Tribes that 
rejecting their argument reduces the phrase 'including 
... chapter 35) ... ' to surplusage. Nonetheless, we can 
find no other reasonable reading of the statute."32 
The statutory glitch isn't an ambiguity; it's a mistake. 
The statute gives a list of examples of reporting and 
withholding provisions, and, wrote Justice Stephen G. 
Breyer, '"chapter 35' is simply a bad example - an 
example that Congress included inadvertently. The 
presence of a bad example in a statute doesn't warrant 
rewriting the remainder of the statute's language."33 
While courts ought to try to give effect to each word 
in a statute "if possible," they can properly ignore 
words that are surplusage - and fourth-tier 
surplusage at that: "a numerical cross-reference in a 
parenthetical. "34 
Parenthetical language isn't as important as nonparen-
thetical language. If parenthetical language appears to 
conflict with another passage in a statute, it's the 
parenthetical that should give way. The "language out-
side the parenthetical is unambiguous," Justice Breyer 
wrote:35 It's only the "reporting and withholding" rules 
for which there should be tribal-state conformity. The 
reference to "chapter 35" is merely in an illustrative 
parenthetical, "hence redundant," 36 with no "inde-
pendent operative effect."37 To give "chapter 35" opera-
tive effect would require rewriting the statute in the 
"strained" way urged by the tribes,38 and that would 
give the statute too broad a sweep. 
32Chickasaw Nation, 122 S. Ct. at 532. 
33Id. at 533. 
34In a passage that will have interpreters shaking their 
heads in 50 years, Justice Breyer analogized the IGRA passage 
to an instruction to "Test drive some cars, including 
Plymouth, Nissan, Chevrolet, Ford, and Kitchenaid." Id. 
35Id. at 532. 
36Id. The government made the point in its brief. The ref-
erence to "chapter 35." 
is merely one of a series of unexplained cross-refer-
ences in an illustrative parenthetical. It cannot fairly be 
said to contradict limitations that inhere in the provi-
sion's central textual command. That is particularly 
true where the result that petitioners seek is a complete 
exemption from two federal excise taxes that are whol-
ly unrelated to the reporting and withholding provi-
sions to which Section 2719(d) otherwise refers. 
Brief for the United States at 7-8, Chickasaw Nation v. United 
States, 122 S. Ct. 528 (2001) (No. 00-507). 
37Chickasaw Nation, 122 S. Ct. at 532. 
38 See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text; Chickasaw 
Nation, 122 S. Ct. at 533. 
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The legislative history, while incomplete, does help in 
interpretation.39 Early drafts of what became IGRA 
specifically provided for tribes to be treated like states 
for purposes of both tax liability and reporting obliga-
tions.40 At those earlier times a parenthetical reference 
to "chapter 35" would have made sense, but then the 
language that would have explicitly exempted tribes 
from tax liability was deleted. Extrapolating from the 
evidence, Justice Breyer concluded that the deletion 
was intentional - Congress didn't mean to exempt 
tribes from wagering tax liability41 - and that the 
parenthetical reference to chapter 35 survived only be-
cause of inadvertence. Breyer didn't know the se-
quence of events, since drafting was done in closed-
door sessions, but "[i]t is far easier to believe that the 
drafters, having included the entire parenthetical while 
the word 'taxation' was still part of the bill, uninten-
tionally failed to remove what had become a super-
fluous numerical cross-reference."42 
In interpreting a statutory provision, a court should pay 
little or no attention to what participants say in later years. 
In a letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
written three years after IGRA' s enactment, Senator 
Daniel Inouye had stated that "it was the intention of 
the Congress that the tax treatment of wagers con-
ducted by tribal governments be the same as that for 
wagers conducted by state governments under Chap-
ter 35."43 Even though Inouye was the self-proclaimed 
"primary author" of IGRA as chair of the Senate Select 
Committee on Indian Affairs, Justice Breyer dismissed 
the letter as reflecting after-the-fact views of one 
Senator, who didn't explain the evolution of the 
statutory language.44 
39Justices Scalia and Thomas didn't sign on to the legisla-
tive history discussion. 
40The original Senate bill provided that 
[p ]revisions of the Internal Revenue Code ... concern-
ing the taxation and the reporting and withholding of 
taxes with respect to gambling or wagering operations 
shall apply to Indian gaming operations .... the same 
as they apply to State operations. 
S. Rep. No. 555, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1987), quoted in 
Chickasaw Nation, 122 S. Ct. at 533. 
41Another possibility, however, is that the reference to 
"taxation" was deleted because of tribal sensitivity. See infra 
note 44. 
42Chickasaw Nation, 122 S. Ct. at 534. A contrary interpreta-
tion, wrote Justice Breyer, "would read back into the Act the 
very word 'taxation' that the Senate committee deleted." Id. 
43Letter from Daniel Inouye to Fred T. Goldberg Jr. (Dec. 
12, 1991), reprinted in Petition for Writ of Certiorari at app. 
112a, 113a, Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 528 
(2001) (No. 00-507). 
44See Chickasaw Nation, 122 S. Ct. at 534. It may be that we 
don't know the full legislative history because of turf battles 
at the time. Kathleen Nilles, tax counsel to Ways and Means 
from 1990 until1994 (i.e., after IGRA's enactment), thinks the 
statute was garbled because of tensions between tax-writing 
committees and the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs. See 
LaFon, supra note 19, at 188. The reference to "taxation" in 
the initial Senate version of the bill, see supra note 40, may 
(Footnote 44 continued in next column.) 
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A tax canon points to tribal taxability. A longstanding 
canon of construction in tax law is that exemptions 
should be narrowly construed: "When Congress enacts 
a tax exemption, it ordinarily does so explicitly."45 Un-
less Congress makes it _clear that a particular tax 
doesn't apply to a particular legal person who would 
otherwise be covered by the statute, the tax is deemed 
to apply. Congress could have exempted American In-
dian tribes from the chapter 35 taxes, of course, but 
nothing in IGRA evidenced an express congressional 
intention to do so. 
In light of the above, these weren't close cases to which 
the American Indian canons should apply. I'll return to the 
Indian canons later, in Part IV. Suffice it to say for now 
that the Court concluded that Chickasaw Nation and 
Choctaw Nation weren't cases in which it was ap-
propriate to give the tribes the benefit of any doubt. In 
fact, the Court concluded that these weren't doubtful 
cases to begin with. 
B. The Dissenters 
In contrast, dissenting Justices O'Connor and Souter 
thought that Chickasaw Nation and Choctaw Nation were 
precisely the sorts of cases, chock-full of ambiguity, for 
which the Indian canons were intended. And if the 
canons applied, with doubts resolved in the tribes' 
favor, the tribes should have been exempt from the 
chapter 35 taxes. 
Of course there's ambiguity in the IGRA provision. Sec-
tion 2719(d), wrote Justice O'Connor, "is subject to 
more than one interpretation"46 - that's why there was 
an issue for Supreme Court review - and, where I 
come from, that's what ambiguity means.47 If so, the 
Court should have had to meet the ambiguities head 
on, not pretend that the ambiguities don't exist. 
There's ambiguity if only because we don't know which 
of the two phrases came first and which was intended to have 
primacy. Justice O'Connor said that the Court made the 
have been deleted "in light of the extreme sensitivity of tribal 
leaders to any suggestion that tribes as governments are sub-
ject to tax .... Unfortunately, the professional staff of the 
Senate Finance Committee did not have an opportunity to 
correct the Indian Affairs Committee's work." J. Christine 
Harris, "Tribes Might Ask Congress to Clarify Intent, Based 
on Chickasaw," Tax Notes, Dec. 3, 2001, p. 1262 (quoting Nil-
les). For what it's worth (nothing, the Court would say), 
Nilles has said that 
it is obvious to me that [section 2719(d)(1)] was in-
tended to provide the same treatment of tribes and 
states under the various code provisions relevant to 
gaming winnings and gaming operations. That is, 
where states are required to withhold and report on 
certain types of gambling winnings paid out to 
patrons, tribal governments have parallel obligations. 
And, where states are exempt from certain taxes (e.g., 
states are exempt under a provision of chapter 35 from 
the federal wagering excise tax), tribes are also exempt. 
Quoted in LaFon, supra note 19, at 187-88. 
45Chickasaw Nation, 122 S. Ct. at 533. 
46Id. at 536 (O'Connor, L dissenting). 
47In our search for ambiguity, it should count for some-
thing that two smart justices, with their smart clerks, and a 
panel of the Federal Circuit thought the statute doesn't mean 
what the majority concluded it must mean. 
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legislative history seem more straightforward than it 
was. IGRA section 2719(d)(l) unquestionably contains 
a mistake, and we can't tell from the face of the statute, 
or from the legislative history, whether Congress erred 
in including the reference to u chapter 35" in the paren-
theticat or whether the error was in not broadening 
the phrase "reporting and withholding of taxes" to 
encompass an exemption from wagering taxes.48 Wrote 
O'Connor: "If the parenthetical was added after the 
restriction, one could just as easily characterize the 
restriction as an unintentional holdover from a previous 
verison of the bill."49 
The reference to "chapter 35" isn't surplusage. Surplusage 
can be ignored, but, wrote Justice O'Connor, that's be-
cause "[s]urplusage is redundant statutory lan-
guage."50 The reference to "chapter 35" isn't redun-
dant, and it's not appropriate to ignore language just 
because it complicates matters: "[T]he Court's reading 
negates language that undeniably bears separate mean-
ing."51 And, if it has meaning, the language points in 
the direction of exemption from taxation. 
Parenthetical language isn't necessarily subordinate to 
nonparentheticallanguage. The dissenters were aware of 
no canon that requires giving greater weight to lan-
guage outside a parenthetical than to language inside 
one. Justice O'Connor wrote, "The importance of 
statutory language depends not on its punctuation, but 
on its meaning."52 
Congressional policy cuts against the Court's conclusion. 
Perhaps the dissenters' most telling point, apart from 
the related argument about the Indian canons of con-
struction, was the congressional policy behind IGRA. 
As Justice O'Connor wrote, quoting from the statute, 
"Congress' central purpose in enacting IGRA was 'to 
provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming 
by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal eco-
nomic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal 
governments."'53 Interpreting IGRA section 2719(d)(l) 
with that purpose in mind points toward tribal exemp-
tion from taxes, both because exemption would reduce 
tribal tax bills and because it would prevent state lot-
teries from having a competitive advantage. 
IV. Why Not the Indian Canons? 
With the meaning of IGRA section 2719(d)(1) not at 
all clear, the skirmishing between the majority and the 
dissenters, outlined above, should have prepared the 
48the error might very well have been in adopting "too 
restrictive a general characterization of the applicable sec-
tions." Chickasaw Nation, 122 S. Ct. at 536 (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting). 
49ld. at 537. 
sold. 
51Jd. 
52Jd. 
53 Chickasaw Nation, 122 S. Ct. at 537 (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting 25 U.S. section 2702(1)). 
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field for the Indian canons of construction. 54 And if the 
canons had applied to resolve ambiguities in Chickasaw 
Nation, they might very well have mandated a tribal 
victory. That's the point of the canons, to serve as a 
tiebreaker in favor of affected tribes in ambiguous 
cases. 
A. Was There an Ambiguity to Be Resolved? 
To avoid giving decisive weight to the canons, the 
Supreme Court therefore had to decide that Chickasaw 
Nation wasn't a case involving ambiguity, and that's 
just what the Court did. Despite the garbled statute, 
the dissents of two members of the Court, and a Federal 
Circuit decision to the contrary, the majority concluded 
that "we cannot say that the statute is 'fairly capable' 
of two interpretations."55 That statement boggles my 
mind, but a conclusion that there's no ambiguity at 
least provides an explanation, consistent with existing 
law, as to why the canons weren't to be given weight 
in Chickasaw Nation: no ambiguity, no need for canons. 
The Court didn't just stop at the no-ambiguity point, 
however. It also threw in some gratuitously disparag-
ing comments about the canons, and, for tribal 
proponents, this may be the most troubling aspect of 
Chickasaw Nation. In the Court's opinion, these central 
principles of American Indian law were reduced to 
little more than rules of convenience, which, in these 
cases, were apparently quite inconvenient. 
For example, quoting a case that had nothing to do 
with American Indian law, Justice Breyer wrote that 
canons "are not mandatory rules. They are guides that 
'need not be conclusive."'56 The canon at issue in the 
quoted case was ejusdem generis - a nice principle, to 
be sure, but historically of far less importance than the 
Indian canons.57 If the Court thinks that all principles 
called canons are created equat perhaps we need to 
come up with a new term in American Indian law to 
describe what for decades had been considered the law. 
The Indian canons can be overcome, Justice Breyer 
wrote,. by " [ o ]ther circumstances evidencing congres-
sional intent."58 In a sense that was true even under 
the traditional understanding of the canons: If congres-
sional intent can be discerned, there's no reason for the 
54This was an issue that attracted a great deal of attention, 
particularly since the Tenth Circuit had essentially ignored the 
canons. At least six amicus briefs were filed on behalf of tribes 
and tribal corporations urging that effect be given to the 
canons of construction. And three Connecticut towns 
(Ledyard, North Stonington, and Preston) that are affected-
negatively, they said - by the Foxwoods casino of the 
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe filed an amicus brief arguing, 
among other things, that the canons had been too broadly 
appliedin the 20th century and that it was inappropriate to 
apply the canons to discern congressional intent in Chickasaw 
Nation. 
5522 S. Ct. at 535. 
56ld. (quoting Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 
115 (2001)). 
57 And, despite the suggestion that canons "need not be 
conclusive," the Court in Circuit City applied the canon. See 
Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 115. 
58Chickasaw Nation, 122 S. Ct. at 535. 
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canons. It's just that Chickasaw Nation doesn't seem to 
have been a case exhibiting those "other circum-
stances." 
Besides, said the Court, the canons were developed 
to interpret treaties, and they should be given less 
weight in interpreting statutes. With another canon of 
construction involved in interpreting IGRA section 
2719(d)(l)- the canon requiring narrow construal of 
exemptions from taxation - there was all the more 
reason to discount the Indian canons. Facing two 
canons aimed in different directions, the Court could 
not "say that the pro-Indian canon is inevitably 
stronger -particularly where the interpretation of a 
congressional statute rather than an Indian treaty is at 
issue."59 
If's not clear why Justice Breyer 
badmouthed the canons. One can't 
help feeling that the Court denigrated 
the canons' importance because it 
realized that its no-ambiguity 
conclusion was difficult to swallow. 
All pretty negative. And it's not clear 'Nhy Justice 
Breyer badmouthed the canons when he didn't need 
to. One can't help feeling that the Court denigrated the 
canons' importance because it realized that its no-
ambiguity conclusion was difficult to swallow in 
Chickasaw Nation. 
Consider another passage in the majority opinion: 
"In this instance, to accept as conclusive the canons on 
which the Tribes rely would produce an interpretation 
that we conclude would conflict with the intent em-
bodied in the statute Congress wrote." 60 At one level, 
as I've already suggested, that statement is unobjec-
tionable: If we know what Congress intended, of course 
we don't need the canons. But let's remember what 
"the statute Congress wrote" was. It was the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act, the purpose of which was, in 
Congress's own words, "to provide a statutory basis 
for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means 
of promoting tribal economic development, self-
sufficiency, and strong tribal governments."61 Tribal 
self-determination was the overriding goal, and, with 
that in mind, how can Justice Breyer's certainty about 
the taxation of tribes be well-founded? 
The statute, the incomplete legislative history, the 
goals of Indian policy - everything pointed toward 
ambiguity, as Justice O'Connor emphasized in dissent: 
"Because nothing in the text, legislative history, or un-
derlying policies of section 2719(d) clearly resolves the 
contradiction inherent in the section, it is appropriate 
59Id. at 535-36. 
60Id. at 535. 
6125 U.S. section 2702(1). 
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to turn to canons of statutory construction."62 And, as 
O'Connor wrote, "In this case, because Congress has 
chosen gaming as a means of enabling the Nations to 
achieve self-sufficiency, the Indian canon rightly dic-
tates that Congress should be presumed to have in-
tended the Nations to rec"eive more, rather than less, 
revenue from this enterprise."63 
My point in this discussion isn't that the tribes 
should have prevailed because the congressional intent 
about tribal taxation was clear. Indeed, my point is 
exactly the opposite. It's because we don't know for 
sure what Congress was doing (and, for that matter, 
Congress might not have known what it was doing) 
that the Indian canons should have been used as a 
tiebreaker. And the tie was, as Justice O'Connor put it, 
"between two equally plausible (or, in this case, equal-
ly implausible) constructions of a troubled statute .... 
Breaking interpretive ties is one of the least controver-
sial uses of any canon of statutory construction."64 
B. Dueling Canons: Tax Versus Indian 
The majority in Chickasaw Nation not only avoided 
giving weight to the Indian canons; it also effectively 
concluded that when the tax canon (construing exemp-
tions from taxation narrowly) conflicts with the Indian 
canons, it's the tax canon that should prevail. 65 The 
dissenters challenged that proposition, stating that the 
"Court has repeatedly held that, when these two 
canons conflict, the Indian canon predominates."66 
Any conflict between the canons was more apparent 
than real in Chickasaw Nation; both the majority and the 
dissenters took the purported tax canon much more 
seriously than it deserved to be taken. Even if it weren't 
true that the Indian canons are more important - and 
of course they are- the tax canon should have been 
heavily discounted as it applied to Indian tribes. 
Whatever the merits of the tax canon in ordinary 
circumstances, and with ordinary taxpayers, it 
shouldn't apply to American Indian tribes. There is no 
presumption that tribes (as distinguished from tribal mem-
bers) are subject to otherwise generally applicable federal 
taxes. Sometimes they are, sometimes they aren't. 
Sometimes Congress is specific about tribal tax 
liability, sometimes it isn't. When Congress isn't 
specific, it's not necessarily the case that tribes are 
deemed to be taxable. With the equivocal status of 
tribes under federal tax law, the Chickasaw Nation Court 
should have questioned whether Congress really in-
tended to impose the wagering taxes on tribes. 
It's true that individual American Indians are subject 
to federal taxes unless a specific provision in the Inter-
62Chickasaw Nation, 122 S. Ct. at 538 (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing). 
63Jd. 
64ld. at 539 (citing William N. Eskridge Jr., et al., Legislation 
and Statutory Interpretation 341 (3d ed., 2001)). 
65 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
66Chickasaw Nation, 122 S. Ct. at 538 (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing). 
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nal Revenue Code or treaty provides otherwiseP In 
generat members of federally recognized tribes are 
taxed like other American citizens. 68 
It's also true that despite their sovereign status, 
American Indian tribes could be taxed. (With each 
taxing statute we'd have to figure nut what sort of 
entity a tribe is, not necessarily an easy task, but pre-
sumably we could do that.)69 Tribal proponents don't 
like it, but it's generally conceded that Congress has 
virtually unlimited power over American tribes, under 
the so-called federal plenary power doctrine. That 
power extends to taxation of the tribes themselves. 
But to say that Congress could tax tribes isn't to say 
that Congress intended to do so in a particular situa-
tion. For example, it's taken for granted today that 
American Indian tribes don't pay federal income taxes, 
and this exemption generally extends to tribal corpo~ 
rations formed under the Indian Reorganization Act as 
well. 70 Someone who reads what the Chickasaw Nation 
majority had to say about exemptions in tax law would 
assume that Congress must have provided, somewhere 
in the income tax portions of the Internal Revenue 
Code, for the exemption of tribes and federally 
chartered tribal corporations. 
Not so. There is no specific statutory exception for tribes 
or tribal corporations.71 The modern (and now somewhat 
dated) version of Felix Cohen's Handbook of American 
Indian Law said simply, "Indian tribes are not taxable 
entities under the income tax provisions of the Internal 
Revenue Code,"72 and then cited not the code, but a 
1967 Revenue Ruling (since amplified by a 1994 
rulingf3 and a 1941 memorandum from the Interior 
67Sometimesspecific rules do come into play. Forexample, 
section 7873 exempts from gross income the income of in-
dividual tribal members, as well as the income of tribes, 
derived from "fishing-rights related activity," generally 
treaty-protected or executive-order-protected fishing activity. 
See Jensen, Warbus, supra note 24 (discussing section 7873). 
68 See Squire v. Capoeman, 351 US. 1 (1956). 
69For example, the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Chickasaw 
Nation contained a lengthy discussion about whether the 
tribe was a "person" for purposes of the taxes on wagering. 
See Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 878-80. 
70 See Rev. Rul. 94-16, 1994-1 C.B. 19, Doc 94-2447, 94 TNT 
41-8 ("Neither an unincorporated Indian tribe nor a corpora-
tion organized under section 17 of the Indian Reorganization 
Act of 1934 is subject to federal income tax on its income, 
regardless of the location of the activities that produced the 
income."). 
71 There's an important distinction between tribal corpora-
tions formed under section 17 of the Indian Reorganization 
Act, which are exempt from federal income taxation, and 
those formed under state law, which aren't. See Rev. Rul. 
94-16, 1994-1 C.B. 19 ("[A] corporation organized by an In-
dian tribe under state law is subject to federal income tax on 
its income, regardless of the location of the activities that 
produced the income."). 
72Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 390 (1982 
ed.) [hereinafter Cohen]. 
73 See Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55 ("Income tax statutes 
do not tax Indian tribes. The tribe is not a taxable entity."), 
amplified by Rev. Rul. 94-16, 1994-1 C.B. 19, quoted in supra 
notes 70-71. 
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Department. 74 In 1997, Professor Scott Taylor wrote 
simply, and correctly, "Tribes are generally exempt 
from federal income tax. The reason for this exemption 
is not altogether clear." 75 
One can imagine why Congress might have decided 
that sovereign tribes and their federally chartered cor-
porations ought not to be subject to the income tax, as 
a matter of first principle, but it's impossible to find 
language in the Internal Revenue Code that evidences 
such a decision. 76 I'm sure that Congress accepts the 
proposition that a tribe (or federally chartered tribal 
corporation) isn't a taxable entity under the income tax, 
but it hasn't said so explicitly. Instead, Congress has 
merely acquiesced in Internal Revenue Service prac-
tice. 
The application of other federal taxes to tribes is less 
clear. For example, tlie FICA and FUTA statutes don't 
specifically mention Indian tribes, but the Service takes 
the position that tribes acting as employers are re-
quired to withhold and make contributions to the FICA 
and FUTA systems. 77 As Professor Taylor noted, the 
Service's position on these issues - that the taxes 
apply unless there's a specific exemption - is the op-
posite of the position it takes with the income tax. 78 
Section 7871 provides that for some particular excise 
taxes, tribal governments shall be treated as states/9 
and the tribes might therefore be exempt from . those 
taxes. Perhaps one can infer from this section that other 
excise taxes, including those in chapter 35, apply to 
tribes withou.t limitation. Perhaps one can infer that, 
74Memo. Sol. Int., May 1, 1941, reprinted in 1 Opinions of the 
Solicitor of the Department of the Interior Relating to Indian Affairs 
1917-1974, at 1044 (n.d.). 
75Scott A. Taylor, "An Introduction and Overview of Taxa-
tion and Indian Gaming," 29 Ariz. St. L.J. 251, 252 (1997). 
76Maybe, the argument might go, tribes aren't subject to 
the income tax because they're not "individuals" or "estates 
or trusts," and maybe they aren't "corporations." (Without 
attempting a full definition, section 7701(a)(3) simply notes 
that "[t]he term 'corporation' includes associations, joint-
stock companies, and insurance companies.") But even if a 
tribe itself isn't a corporation, a tribal corporation presum-
ably would be, and such corporations formed under the In-
dian Reorganization Act have also been deemed to be exempt 
from the income tax. See Rev. Rul. 81-295, 1981-2 C.B. 15 ("The 
federally chartered Indian tribal corporation shares the same 
tax status as the Indian tribe and is not taxable on income 
from activities carried on within the boundaries of the reser-
vation."), amplified by Rev.Rul. 94-16, 1994-1 C.B. 19 (extend-
ing principle to income earned outside the reservation). 
Treating a tribal corporation as equivalent to the tribe itself 
clearly isn't mandated by the code's language. 
77Cohen, supra note 72, at 399; see also Ann. 2001-16,2001-8 
IRB 715, Doc 2001-2897 (3 original pages), 2001 TNT 20-7 
(providing guidance to tribes on FUTA obligations). 
78 See Taylor, supra note 75, at 253-54; see also Robyn L. 
Robinson, "A Discussion of the Application of FICA and 
FUTA to Indian Tribes' On-Reservation Activities," 25 Am. 
Ind. L. Rev. 37 (2000 I 2001) (questioning how the Service can 
take one position with the income tax and another with FICA 
and FUTA). 
79Section 7871 (a )(2 ). 
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but with the mixed authority, that's all one can say: 
Perhaps.80 
I hope that's enough detail to demonstrate that 
trying to discern a generally applicable congressional 
intent on the taxation of American Indian tribes is like 
rooting for the Montreal Expos: It's a way of whiling 
away the summer, but it's not going to lead to any-
thing. The federal tax treatment of American Indian 
tribes and their federally chartered corporations isn't 
nearly as uniform as the Court implied in Chickasaw 
Nation. If a tax "canon" emerges from all of this for 
tribes- and I'm skeptical that one does- it must be 
much narrower than what the Court suggested. 
Trying to discern a generally 
applicable congressional intent on the 
taxation of American Indian tribes is 
like rooting for the Montreal Expos: 
It's a way of whiling away the summer, 
but it's not going to lead to anything. 
With this background, it wouldn't have been 
surprising if Congress, in considering IGRA, had con-
cluded that tribes wouldn't be subject to the chapter 
35 taxes on wagering, without specific congressional 
approval. 81 And given the extraordinary federal policy 
behind IGRA - to facilitate on-reservation gambling 
as a means of improving the economic self-sufficiency 
of tribes - exempting the tribes from the excises and 
80See also Cohen, supra note 72, at 402-403 (discussing un-
clear application of excise taxes to tribes). 
81I've cited some post-1988 authority, like Revenue Ruling 
94-16, in trying to determine what Congress might have been 
thinking in 1988, but I don't think that's unfair. In general, 
the later authority is merely an extrapolation of previously 
existing understandings. 
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occupational taxes of chapter 35 makes more than a 
little sense. 
V. Conclusion 
I began this essay by hi~ting that Chickasaw Nation 
might help us in deciphering statutes that make no 
sense, but that's probably too lofty a goal. In an inter-
pretive situation with no American Indian law over-
tones, it's hard to imagine a generally applicable 
default rule to apply where statutory language points 
in two diametric directions and no rule of statutory 
construction provides a tiebreaker. After a court has 
emptied the usual bag of tricks (plain meaning, pur-
pose, structure, and so on), it can do little but cope. It 
must decide one way or the other - the coin flip -
while recognizing that Congress has the power to undo 
any judicial mistake. 82 
But when tiebreakers based on settled doctrine are 
available, a court should embrace. them. The Court in 
Chickasaw Nation tried to do that with its "tax canon," 
but it gave more weight to the canon than it could bear. 
And it pushed to the side a much more clearly ap-
plicable tiebreaker, the Indian canons of construction, 
by adopting a cramped view of when the Indian canons 
should apply. The Court concluded that Chickasaw N a-
tion and Choctaw Nation weren't cases for the canons 
because there was no ambiguity that the canons could 
help resolve, and, on the facts, that was a bewildering 
conclusion. I'm willing to go further: That was anal-
most indefensible conclusion. 
82There's no way to force, or even to strongly encourage, 
Congress to deal with broken statutes. But see Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, "A Plea for Legislative Review," 60 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
995, 1011-1017 (1987) (urging method to prompt "a congres-
sional second look," something like a remand to Congress). 
Given the sensitive political nature of the issues in Chickasaw 
Nation, I doubt that Congress would want to revisit the issues 
anyway. Changing the IGRA provision would go far beyond 
what we would consider a "technical correction" in other 
contexts. 
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